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Abstract
Both psychologists and economists have argued that rewards often have
hidden costs. One possible reason is that the principal may have incentives to
o¤er higher rewards when she knows the task to be di¢cult. Our experiment
tests if high rewards embody such bad news and if this is perceived by their
recipients. Our design allows us to decompose the overall e¤ect of rewards on
e¤ort into a direct incentive and an informational e¤ect. The results show that
most participants correctly interpret high rewards as bad news. In accordance
with theory, the negative informational e¤ect co-exists with the direct positive
e¤ect.
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11 Introduction
Rewards are used in many types of relationships. While there is much evidence that
rewards can be an e¤ective way of motivating people, there is also a vast collection of
experiments showing that rewards can have unintended consequences. Often, these
negative e¤ects of rewards are hidden at …rst, and do not manifest themselves until
later in the relationship. For instance, the promise of a gift for obtaining high grades
at school may well keep a child studying hard, whilst at the same time undermining
any genuine interest in learning and thereby having profound negative consequences
later on. Similarly, promising a grati…cation to employees for successfully completing
a project may well temporarily increase their e¤orts, only to result in a reduced
interest in their job afterwards. A good understanding of why and when such negative
e¤ects are most likely to occur is important for the optimal design of contracts and
other incentive schemes.
We conducted an experiment to bring these hidden costs to the surface. We study
an environment in which the principal has incentives to promise a higher bonus when
she knows that the task is di¢cult. We …nd that agents understand this, and interpret
the bonus as bad news. This negative information e¤ect induces costs that are usually
hidden because in the short term they are outweighed by the direct positive incentive
e¤ect. Our experimental design allows to decompose the overall impact on motivation
into these two di¤erent e¤ects, a feature that distinguishes our experiment from the
existing literature.
In our experiment, two players are anonymously matched to each other, one in
the role of the principal (“she”), the other in the role of the agent (“he”). The design
is based on a simpli…ed version of the model by Bénabou and Tirole (2003) which
gives a game-theoretic explanation for the “hidden costs” e¤ect based on information
asymmetries. A key element is that the agent is uncertain about the task di¢culty
(i.e., cost of e¤ort), while the principal knows whether the task is easy or di¢cult. In
the …rst stage, the principal decides upon an up-front …xed wage and a bonus that
is contingent on good performance. In the second stage, after observing the bonus
and the wage, the agent chooses whether or not to exert e¤ort. Good performance
2requires exerting e¤ort, and results in a higher joint pro…t of the players irrespective
of the task di¢culty. Parameters are such that without a bonus, the agent would gain
from exerting e¤ort on the easy task, which is su¢ciently self-rewarding, but not on
the di¢cult task. In equilibrium the principal o¤ers a bonus only when she observes
high costs. Thus, a high reward increases e¤ort but brings bad news for the agent,
resulting in potential hidden costs.
The key feature we introduced in the experimental design is an additional project
for the agent. Besides the joint project with the principal, the agent also chooses
an e¤ort level for his own project. The only di¤erence between the projects is that
the bonus and the wage speci…ed by the principal do not apply to the agent’s own
project. This takes away the incentive e¤ect of the bonus, but not the information
e¤ect, and therefore allows us to isolate the informational content as perceived by the
agent.
The results provide clear support for the main predictions of the model. First, we
…nd that the bonus o¤ered by the principal is strongly related to the di¢culty of the
project in the informed condition: when costs are high, the principal is 50 percentage
points more likely to give a bonus. Thus, the bonus is very informative about the cost
level, and the principal understands the need to o¤er a high reward when costs are
high. Secondly, a high bonus is very e¤ective in stimulating e¤ort in the joint project
through the direct incentive e¤ect (the monetary bene…ts of the reward). Finally, we
also …nd evidence of the informational e¤ect of rewards (the hidden costs): rewards are
correctly perceived by the agents as conveying bad news, decreasing their motivation
to invest in their own project. This e¤ect becomes especially strong in later rounds.
In the last 10 rounds, the likelihood of the agents’ exerting high e¤ort on their own
project is around 34 percentage points lower after receiving a bonus.
To investigate the agents’ reaction to bonuses that have no informational content
we also introduced a control treatment, in which the principal had no private infor-
mation about the task. As predicted, we …nd that in the control treatment a bonus
is still very e¤ective in stimulating e¤ort in the joint project, but the negative e¤ect
on e¤ort in the own project is mostly absent. A possible concern might furthermore
3be that a high bonus signals the principal’s altruistic attitude rather than task dif-
…culty. Therefore, as a further control, we also elicited some components of social
preferences of participants using various modi…cations of a trust game. We do not
…nd any support that the above results are driven by fairness considerations.
This paper is related to a vast literature that explores “crowding out” of intrinsic
motivation by rewards or other types of extrinsic incentives.1 Experiments in social
psychology, starting from Deci (1971), Kruglanski et al. (1971) and Lepper et al.
(1973), have shown that a promise of a performance-contingent reward for an inter-
esting task may undermine a participant’s attitude to the task and make his or her
future engagement in similar activities less likely in the absence of rewards. This
long-term negative e¤ect (the hidden costs) may coexist with the immediate positive
e¤ect of rewards that act as short-term reinforcers. Two types of arguments have
been put forward for explaining such e¤ects. The …rst emphasizes the controlling
aspect of rewards. Rewards undermine participants’ self-determination to engage in
the task and do the task well (see Deci and Ryan (1985)). The other underscores
the informational aspects of rewards: agents perceive high rewards as embodying bad
news about task di¢culty and their ability to complete the task successfully. This in-
terpretation of rewards comes from the "overjusti…cation e¤ect", according to which
people start to attribute their engagement in any activity to the external rewards,
displacing part of their intrinsic interest. In psychology these ideas can be accommo-
dated by theories based on cognitive dissonance (Festinger (1957)) or, alternatively,
on self-perception theory (Bem (1967)). Bénabou and Tirole (2003) explore this idea
in a game-theoretic framework and show that these hidden costs can indeed occur as
an equilibrium phenomenon.
Of course, agents can only make proper inferences from rewards if they are aware of
the principals’ objectives. In Deci (1971) and related experiments, however, rewards
have been administered by the experimenter, whose objectives were not clear to
participants.2 To the best of our knowledge ours is the …rst experiment in which
1See Frey (1997), Frey and Jegen (2001) and Fehr (2002) for a discussion of many earlier contri-
butions.
2See a meta-analysis in Deci et al. (1999) or a book Deci and Ryan (1985) for extensive accounts of
this literature; see also Lepper et al. (1999) and Eisenberger et al. (1999) for a di¤erent perspective.
4rewards are determined by active participants with well-de…ned objectives that are
common knowledge to all participants, and the information asymmetry about the
task is directly introduced into the experiment in a controlled manner.
Another important strand of literature demonstrates crowding-out e¤ects in ex-
perimental labor markets, often using variations of the gift-exchange game by Fehr
et al. (1993) and Fehr et al. (1997). In contrast to our work, though, all these stud-
ies are focused on how extrinsic incentives interact with various aspects of broadly
de…ned social preferences. In particular, Fehr and Gächter (2001) show that the use
of both performance-contingent rewards and sanctions reduces e¤ort provision and
aggregate payo¤s (see also Fehr and List (2004)). Fehr and Schmidt (2007) show
that adding a stick (a …ne) to a carrot (a bonus) in an incentive contract may have
a detrimental e¤ect on the agents’ performance. Relatedly, in a modi…ed trust game
where the investor has an option to impose sanctions on the trustee for insu¢cient
cooperation, Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) show that using the option to …ne the
trustee back…res compared to a pure trust game where this option is unavailable. In
contrast, withdrawing from applying this option when it is available has a positive
impact both on the aggregate and on the principal’s own average payo¤. An expla-
nation put forward in these experiments is that the principal’s reliance on extrinsic
incentives or control signals her lack of trust in the agent, who then reciprocates by
indeed behaving in a distrustful manner.3
In a …eld experiment Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) …nd that the introduction of
a …ne on parents that arrive late to collect their children at a day-care increases the
occurrences of late-coming parents, rather than deter parents from doing so. They
interpret this e¤ect in terms of learning by the parents about the mildness of the
day-care owners. Ariely et al. (2009) …nd a detrimental e¤ect on performance when
rewards become very high, consistent with the idea that people experience increased
arousal and choke under the pressure. In contrast, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b)
show that very small performance-contingent rewards impair their performance com-
3Sliwka (2007) investigates in a theoretical model how information about social norms of behavior
can be transmitted from more informed principals to less informed agents via the choice of incentive
schemes.
5pared to no-reward condition, possibly because they insult the agents.
Several experimental studies show that other types of interventions can have a
detrimental impact on performance. Falk and Kosfeld (2006) showed that the princi-
pal’s choice to control the agent (i.e., enforce a minimum e¤ort) reduces the agents’
performance because most agents perceive control as a signal of distrust and low ex-
pectations by the principal. Galbiati et al. (2009) examine the e¤ects of sanctions in
a coordination game. Cooperative subjects perceive endogenous sanctions by a third
party as a negative signal about the contributions of others, which takes away the
sanction e¤ect. Relatedly, Charness et al. (2010) showed that delegating the wage
choice to agents increases e¤ort. Dickinson and Villeval (2004) study the relation
between the degree of monitoring and e¤ort, …nding some support for crowding out.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
model. In section 3 we describe the experimental setup and hypotheses. The results
are described in section 4, and the …nal section concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Informed Principal
The main treatment of our experiment is based on a simpli…ed version of the model
by Bénabou and Tirole (2003). There are two risk-neutral players, a principal (she)
and an agent (he). The agent works on a task that is potentially self-rewarding. He
chooses a binary e¤ort level,  2 f01g The low level of e¤ort,  = 0, implies no
cost, and leads to payo¤s 0 and 0 for the agent and the principal respectively. The
high level of e¤ort,  = 1, costs   0 to the agent. It results in a higher output, and
yields an additional payo¤ of ¢  0 for the agent and ¢  0 for the principal.
To stimulate the agent, the principal may promise a bonus  to be paid if the agent
chooses the high e¤ort level. Thus, her payo¤ is:

 = 0 + (¢ ¡ )
where  2 f0g The agent’s payo¤ is:

 = 0 + (¢ +  ¡ )
6There is uncertainty about the cost of e¤ort: it is common knowledge that  is
equally likely to be high,  or low,   . This can be interpreted as uncertainty
about the di¢culty of the task. The principal is perfectly informed about the di¢culty
of the task. The agent only has a rough idea about the level of costs: he receives
a private signal,  about the cost of e¤ort which assumes two possible values,  2
fg With probability   05 the signal is correct, i.e., signal  arrives when
costs are   2 fg. This is a discrete version of the MLRP assumption. Thus,
receiving signal  is “good news” for the agent. The signal can be interpreted as
a measure of the agent’s self-con…dence, which determines his motivation to do the
task. Note that the principal does not observe the agent’s private signal.
A situation where the principal is better informed about the di¢culty of the task
is not exceptional: it arises whenever the task is new to the agent, whereas the
principal has observed other agents working on similar tasks before. The principal
may be, for instance, an experienced manager, a teacher or a parent, while the agent
is a young employee, a student or a child. In this model a bonus, promised by the
principal, a¤ects the agent’s motivation via two channels. First, it directly increases
the agent’s incentives to exert high e¤ort by providing a monetary compensation.
Second, because it is o¤ered by an informed principal, it potentially a¤ects the agent’s
beliefs about the di¢culty of the task.
Before describing the equilibrium, we emphasize that we present a restricted ver-
sion of Bénabou and Tirole’s model. While our version captures its essential features,
the original model is more general and has a much broader set of applications. In
particular, the principal may be better informed not only about characteristics of
the task, but also about the agent’s personal qualities. Although we have restricted
the set of feasible bonuses, the main results of Bénabou and Tirole (2003) (their
Proposition 1, page 497) still hold:4
Proposition 1 (i) Rewards are positive short-term reinforcers: if both bonuses  = 0
and  =  are given with positive probability in equilibrium, then the probability that
4Bénabou and Tirole’s (2003) proof applies almost verbatim despite the modi…cations in the
model.
7the agent exerts e¤ort after  =  is higher than after  = 0.
(ii) Rewards are bad news: when the task is easy, the principal o¤ers a (weakly)
lower bonus: if  and  are bonuses given with positive probability when costs are
high ( = ) and low ( = ) respectively, then  ¸ 
(iii) Rewards undermine the agent’s assessment of the task’s attractiveness: for
any 0 2 fg : [j = ]  [j = 00]
The …rst claim is straightforward: promising more money for less work would
be clearly suboptimal. The second claim relies heavily on the two-sided asymmetric
information: the principal is privately informed about the costs of e¤ort, while the
agent privately observes the signal about the costs of e¤ort. When the costs are low,
the agent is more optimistic on average. Hence, it is cheaper for the principal to rely
on his intrinsic motivation and not provide additional incentives. While the presence
of two-sided asymmetric information complicates the model, it is an indispensable
ingredient. Finally, the third claim captures the essential idea that rewards bring bad
news; it follows immediately from the second part of the Proposition.
To make the model nontrivial, we impose several restrictions on parameters. First,
we assume that ¢  ; otherwise, the principal would never …nd it worthwhile to
o¤er a bonus. Moreover, for the agent’s decision problem to be non-trivial, we assume
that were the agent to know the cost of e¤ort, he would exert e¤ort without a bonus
if costs are low but not if costs are high:   ¢   Exerting e¤ort without any
bonus can be thought of as re‡ecting the intrinsic motivation. Finally, we assume
that the bonus is su¢ciently high to make e¤ort attractive even if costs are high:
 + ¢   Under these assumptions, there are two possible types of Perfect
Bayesian Nash Equilibria that satisfy the "D1 re…nement" (Cho and Kreps (1987)).
The …rst one is a pooling equilibrium in which the principal never gives a bonus.
The second type is the more interesting partially separating equilibrium in which the
principal never gives the bonus if cost of e¤ort is low, and randomizes between the
bonus and no bonus when the cost of e¤ort is high.5
5For this game, the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)) is too weak to eliminate equi-
libria supported by beliefs that do not seem very plausible. For instance, there may be a pooling
equilibrium in which the principal o¤ers a bonus under any costs, sustained by beliefs by the agent
8In the experiment we implemented parameters under which the equilibrium out-
come is unique and it is partially separating, so that receiving a bonus is informative
about the cost of e¤ort. These parameter values are summarized in Table 1. Since
e¤ort and the bonus are binary decisions, from here on we simply say that the choice
is between e¤ort and no e¤ort, and a bonus or no bonus. It is straightforward to
verify that the equilibrium outcome is as follows (see the Appendix for a proof):
Proposition 2 Given the set of parameters in Table 1, in the unique Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium outcome of the game satisfying D1:
² The principal o¤ers no bonus if costs are low ( = ) and randomizes between
no bonus and bonus  if costs are high ( = ).
² The agent exerts e¤ort if he is promised bonus  and/or if receives a good signal;
if he obtains a bad signal and is promised no bonus he randomizes between high
e¤ort and no e¤ort.6
The model itself does not explicitly take into account social preferences. In the
experiment, however, we also allow the principal to provide an up-front …xed wage
that is independent of success. This wage may be used as an additional channel to
adjust di¤erences in payo¤s between the players. Even though some additional Perfect
Bayesian Equilibria exist with the …xed wage option, in the Appendix we prove that
none of these additional equilibria satisfy the D1 criterion when the agent’s private
signal is su¢ciently precise (i.e.,   ¢). The implemented parameters satisfy
this condition, so no strictly positive …xed wage is used in equilibrium and Proposition
2 still holds.
2.2 Uninformed Principal
In a control treatment of the experiment we analyze the same model, but assume
that the principal does not observe the di¢culty of the project when she sets bonus
that no bonus means high costs.
6More precisely, under our set of parameters, the principal randomizes between no bonus and
bonus  with probabilities 13 and 23 when costs are high; the agent randomizes between high and
low e¤ort with probabilities 19 and 89 after getting no bonus and low signal.
9. Let bonuses  be determined by:
 = maxf0[j = ] ¡ 4g;
 = maxf0[j = ] ¡ 4g
Then, the agent’s best response is to exert e¤ort if he is o¤ered bonus  >  or
if o¤ered a bonus  >  and he received signal . Under our parametrization  = 0
and  = 75. In the unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome, the (uninformed)
principal o¤ers no bonus, and the agent chooses  = 1 if gets a good signal and  = 0
otherwise.
3 Experimental set-up and hypotheses
3.1 Design
The experiment implements the model described in the previous section, with para-
meters as summarized in Table 1. We …rst describe the main treatment (“informed
condition”). In every round, two players are anonymously matched to each other, one
in the role of principal, the other in the role of agent. There are two stages. In the
…rst stage, the principal observes the di¢culty of the project ( = 15 or  = 45)
and then speci…es the bonus  2 f020g and the …xed wage  2 f0510g for the
agent. The …xed wage is paid to the agent irrespective of the agent’s choices, while
the bonus is paid only if the agent chooses the high level of e¤ort.
In the second stage, the agent (who so far only knows that  = 15 or  = 45
with equal probabilities) observes the bonus and the wage o¤ered by the principal,
and acquires the private signal about the di¢culty of the project (which is correct
with probability 34). Then, he chooses whether or not to exert e¤ort on this joint
project,  2 f01g. High e¤ort by the agent increases the payo¤ for both players by
¢ = ¢ = 30. As in many experiments, the task is one of “stated e¤ort” rather
than “real e¤ort”. While a real e¤ort task would have the advantage of being more
realistic, we opted for using a stated e¤ort task that enabled us to create a more
controlled environment in which we can implement the exact structure of the two
sided private information.
10A key feature of the design is to introduce the second, own project for the agent.
The principal derives no bene…t from the agent’s own project and, therefore, the
bonus applies only to the joint project. In all other respects, the two projects are
identical; in particular, their cost realizations are perfectly correlated and the agent
receives a single informative signal that applies equally to both projects he is facing.
The agent chooses the e¤ort level  2 f01g that he wants to apply to his own
project simultaneously with his choice of . Since the agent receives no bonus for his
own project, the bonus cannot be a direct motivator in this case. However, insofar
as the agent infers any information from the bonus, this inference will have an equal
impact on his e¤ort level in both tasks.
This feature of the experiment allows us to distill the informational aspects of
rewards as perceived by the agent from the direct incentive e¤ects. Alternatively, we
could have asked the agent to report his beliefs about the costs. However, our method
has clear advantages over elicitation of beliefs. Most importantly, asking for beliefs
would have made it more salient that we expect adjustments in beliefs depending on
the bonus, prompting participants to think more consciously of this.
Besides the main treatment we had a control treatment (“uninformed condition”)
In the control treatment the principal was not given any private information on the
costs. This was common knowledge to the players. By comparing the agents’ reaction
to bonuses o¤ered by the informed and uninformed principals we have a robustness
check to determine the extent to which the agents’ reaction to bonuses is explained
by the principals’ access to private information about the task.
Finally, in 6 of the 8 sessions, we added a third stage where we measure several
dimensions of social preferences. We used this as an extra robustness check to ensure
that the behavior we …nd is not due to other-regarding preferences. For this, we
implemented a design based on Cox (2004), with between-subject procedures being
replaced by within-subject ones. First, participants were matched in pairs and played
a standard trust game. The sender was endowed with 20 points and could send
any multiple of …ve to the receiver (denoted by , for “sent in trust game”). The
amount sent was tripled, and the receiver then decided how much to return (,
11“return in trust game”). Every participant played this game in both roles, using the
strategy method for receivers (i.e., asking asking about their reaction to all possible
actions by the sender). The main reason for using the strategy method was avoiding
emotional spillovers to subsequent periods rather than generating more data. In
the third round, every participant played the game once more as a sender, but this
time without an option for receivers to return any amount (, for “sent in dictator
game”). Finally, each participant played once more as a receiver, but now with
the amount received being randomly determined by the computer rather than being
selected by the matched sender (, “returned if amount random”). The computer-
generated amount was subtracted from the matched sender’s account. Participants
faced di¤erent partners in di¤erent periods.
The purpose of this design is to have a multi-dimensional measure of social atti-
tudes. Based on the data collected we constructed four variables re‡ecting social pref-
erences. Altruism is de…ned as the fraction out of the endowment sent to the receiver
in the dictator game (20). The di¤erence in fraction sent between the dictator
game and the gift exchange game is used as a proxy for trust (20 ¡ 20). We
de…ne fairness as the fraction of the amount received that is returned to the sender
when the amount received was determined randomly (; averaged over
the possible positive amounts received). The di¤erence in fraction returned between
this treatment and the treatment where the amount received was determined by the
sender is de…ned as the degree of reciprocity ( ¡ ). We clas-
sify participants that are above median on these measures as "Altruist," "Trusting,"
"Fair," and "Reciprocal."
3.2 Procedures
We ran 8 sessions with 156 participants in total. The number of participants in each
session varied between 18 and 24, depending on show up. In four of the sessions we
formed independent subgroups with at least 10 subjects in every group to increase
the number of independent observations. This gives us a total of 12 independent
groups. Participants played a total of 32 rounds of the game, of which 20 rounds
12in the informed condition, and 12 the uninformed condition.7 We let them play
more rounds in the informed condition because of its relative complexity relative to
the uninformed condition. Half of the groups started in the informed condition (I-U
groups), the other half started in the uninformed condition (U-I groups). Participants
were rematched after every round, to approximate the one-shot nature of the game.
Group sizes were too small to ensure that participants never met more than once, but
the matching was anonymous and we explained to them that no participant would
ever meet the same participant more than once within cycles of 5 consecutive rounds.
All players switched roles at certain points, so that they played half of the time as
principal and half of the time as agents. Such role switching is commonly used in
signaling games to facilitate learning (see, e.g., Brandts and Holt (1992), Cooper and
Kagel (2005) and Kübler et al. (2008)). At the end of every round, players observe
the cost of the project and payo¤s for both players.
The instructions explaining the game were framedin terms of a labormarket, using
terminology such as principal, worker, wage, and bonus, etc.8 We conjecture that
most people associate a bonus with something positive. If so, they are, if anything,
less likely to infer negative information from a bonus than if we would use more
neutral terminology, giving a more stringent test of the hypothesis.
The experiment was computerized using Z-tree (Fischbacher (2007)). Sessions
took place in 2009-2011 at two Russian universities (NES and ANE, Moscow). Par-
ticipants were paid for their decisions in every round, with earnings averaging 370
Rubles (approximately $13). Participants in the role of the agent were paid for
only one of the two projects determined randomly, to avoid risk hedging behavior
(see Blanco et al. (2010)). Sessions lasted for about 90 minutes. All participants
7In two of the sessions we had a technical problem. In one of these sessions we had to restart
the computers after seven rounds in the main treatment. We dropped four participants from the
data who could not continue after the interruption and did not …nish the entire session. In the
other session, we have missing observations for 24 participants for the last eight rounds in the main
treatment. We decided to keep these observations, but there are no essential changes in our estimates
if they are removed from the analysis. In both cases, all participants completed all rounds of the
control treatment.
8Cooper (2003) show that a meaningful context can accelerate learning in experiments with
signaling games; Cooper et al. (1999) show that the impact of the context depends crucially on the
audience (students vs. managers). Even though potentially there are problems of demand-induced
behavior of the subjects, we would not expect such problems in our set-up.
13were economics students with no or little training in game theory or behavioral eco-
nomics. A translation of the instructions is included in the Appendix (the original is
in Russian).
3.3 Hypotheses
Based on the propositions in the previous section, we formulate the three main hy-
potheses.
Hypothesis 1 An informed principal is more likely to o¤er a bonus when she ob-
serves a high level of costs, so that the bonus embodies bad news.
The …rst hypothesis implies that a promise of a bonus brings bad news about task
di¢culty. The second hypothesis stipulates that the positive direct incentive e¤ect of
the bonus outweighs this negative information:
Hypothesis 2 A bonus increases e¤ort by the agent in the joint project.
The third hypothesis states that the negative information, contained in the bonus,
is correctly inferred by the agent and reduces his intrinsic motivation.
Hypothesis 3 With an informed principal, the agent infers bad news from a bonus
and reduces e¤ort in his own project.
4 Results
4.1 Main treatment
We …rst discuss the results from the main treatment, and postpone the discussion
of the control treatment (uninformed condition) and social preferences to the next
subsections.
To be conservative, we always treat the group means as the units of observation
when we use nonparametric tests, giving us 12 independent observations for each
condition. We did not …nd any indication of order e¤ects of the conditions (I-U
versus U-I groups), so we only report the results of all groups combined.
14In the main treatment (informed condition) the principal observes the cost of
e¤ort and can adjust the bonus to the cost of e¤ort. We …rst verify that the bonus is
informative about the level of costs, which is a crucial part of the experiment. Figure 1
shows the results. It is indeed the case that the level of the bonus is very informative.
When costs are high, the principal gives the bonus 80% of the time, compared to only
32% when the costs are low, and this di¤erence is signi…cant (Wilcoxon signed rank
test,  = 31,  = 002, two-tailed test). This shows that rewards are informative
about the cost level.
Table 2 shows the marginal estimates of a probit model with standard errors
clustered at the group level.9 Column 1 shows that if costs are high, the likelihood
that a bonus is given increases by 48 percentage points. In column 2, we control
for the social preferences measures. Possibly, the relatively fair-minded principals
are more likely to give a bonus, in which case the bonus also becomes informative
about the fairness of the principal. We do not …nd any signi…cant e¤ects of the social
preferences variables on the likelihood of giving a bonus. The e¤ect of high costs is by
far the best predictor of a bonus. In section 4.3 we will discuss potential interaction
e¤ects with social preferences. When we only consider the …rst or last 10 rounds
(columns 3 and 4), we see that the coe¢cient of high costs becomes somewhat larger
in the last 10 rounds, but is already large in the …rst ten rounds.
Result 1 A bonus is very informative about the level of costs in the informed condi-
tion. High costs increase the likelihood of a bonus by around 50 percentage points.
This result con…rms hypothesis 1.
Before turning to the response by the agents, it is also worthwhile to examine the
…xed wages o¤ered by the principals. The vast majority of principals gives a zero …xed
wage. This is largely independent of the observed costs. A positive wage is given 23%
and 18% of the time when costs are respectively low and high. Figure 2 shows that
9We also estimated all speci…cations using a linear probability model with random or …xed e¤ects
at the group level, and a probit model with group random e¤ects. All speci…cations give very similar
results. In particular, the size and signi…cance of our main variable of interest (the impact of a bonus
on e¤ort) is robust across di¤erent speci…cations.
15the principal is only a bit more likely to o¤er a positive …xed wage when she o¤ers
no bonus, and the distribution of …xed wages is very similar after observing high or
low costs. Thus, the up-front …xed wage is not very informative about the observed
cost level by the principal. The estimates from Table 2 are also essentially unchanged
if we analyze the bonus and wage decisions simultaneously in a multivariate probit
model (not reported).
We now turn to the behavior of agents. Before we study the impact of a bonus
on e¤ort in the own project, we examine the impact on e¤ort in the joint project. In
equilibrium, the size of the reward should o¤set any negative information e¤ects, and
have a positive impact on e¤ort in the joint project. Recall also that the agent receives
an informative private signal about the cost of e¤ort, giving an indication that costs
are low or high. Because the agent’s reaction to a bonus can di¤er depending on the
signal, we report results for each signal. We will refer to the private signal of low
costs as "good signal" as this is positive news for the agent.
A bonus is indeed very e¤ective in stimulating e¤ort in the joint project. When
agents receive no bonus, 21% (after a bad private signal) and 60% (after a good
private signal) of the agents exert e¤ort. After receiving a bonus, 92% of the agents
exert e¤ort in the joint project after each signal. The two most left bars in Figure
3 show the increase in e¤ort split by signal for the main treatment. The di¤erence
in e¤ort between a bonus and no bonus is signi…cant for each private signal (in both
cases  = 31,  = 002 signed rank test).
Table 3 reports marginal e¤ects of Probit estimations and con…rms the results
from the nonparametric tests. We include an interaction term for bonus and good
signal since, as mentioned before, the e¤ect of a bonus is expected to be di¤erent
depending on the signal.10 Columns 1 and 2 report the marginal e¤ects on e¤ort in
the joint project.11 The e¤ect of receiving a bonus is large and signi…cant whether
or not controlling for gender and the social preferences measures (in the next section
10Here and elsewhere, when we report marginal e¤ects of a Probit regression, the coe¢cient and
standard error of the interaction term are corrected to account for the nonlinear nature of the model,
see Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al. (2004).
11The number of observations is lower if we control for social preferences since we did not collect
this information in all sessions. We also have missing information on gender for 7 subjects.
16we discuss some interaction e¤ects with social preferences). As can be seen from
the interaction term, the e¤ect of a bonus on e¤ort is smaller after receiving a good
signal, because e¤ort is already relatively high in that case even with no bonus. But
also in that case the bonus has a signi…cant and large e¤ect on e¤ort. If we estimate
these speci…cations separately for the …rst set of ten rounds and the second (last) set
of ten rounds, we …nd that the e¤ect of a bonus on e¤ort in the joint project is highly
signi…cant in both cases (not reported).
Thus, we can con…rm hypothesis 2 for the informed condition.
Result 2 With an informed principal, a bonus increases e¤ort in the joint project.
The next question is whether or not rewards are perceived correctly as informative
by the agent. We can investigate this by looking at e¤ort in the own project. The
bonus o¤ered by the principal does not apply to the own project, so the only reason
why a bonus might have an impact is that the agent infers informational content from
it. If so, a bonus should reduce e¤ort. Figure 4 shows the increase in e¤ort between
a bonus and no bonus. Following a bonus, e¤ort in the own project is 19 percentage
points lower after each signal (good and bad signal), and both these di¤erences are
signi…cant ( = 31,  = 002).
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 report the marginal e¤ects on e¤ort in the own project.
Receiving a bonus substantially reduces the likelihood of exerting e¤ort on the own
project. After controlling for social preferences, the coe¢cient is -19.5 percentage
points after receiving a bad signal, and reduced further by another 6.2 percentage
points after a good signal. The coe¢cient is naturally somewhat smaller (in absolute
terms) after a bad signal, because the e¤ort is already relatively low in that case.
Thus, a bonus is perceived as bad news.
Since it is counter-intuitive that a bonus is bad news, one may expect that par-
ticipants show some learning over the course of the experiment. Figure 5 plots for
every round the mean di¤erence in e¤ort in the own project between a bonus and
no bonus (using a 3-round moving average to smooth out some of the variation).
Inspection of the …gure reveals that there is a clear downward trend in the di¤erence
17in e¤ort. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 show indeed that in the …rst 10 rounds the
e¤ect is mostly absent after a bad signal but already present after a good signal (the
coe¢cients of bonus and bonus X goodsignal are jointly signi…cantly di¤erent from
zero,  = 023). In the last 10 rounds, the negative e¤ect becomes very strong: after
receiving a bonus, e¤ort in the own project decreases by 34 percentage points.
Thus, while a bonus is by itself a good motivator, and agents respond positively
to a bonus in the joint project, agents also correctly infer that a bonus conveys bad
news about costs in the informed condition, and reduce investments in their own
project. This e¤ect is particularly strong in the last 10 rounds. We can therefore
con…rm hypothesis 3.
Result 3 Agents correctly infer bad news from a bonus in the informed condition,
leading them to reduce e¤ort in the own project.
Overall, our results so far provide clear support for the model. Participants in
the role of principal use rewards to stimulate the agents, and agents respond to these
rewards as expected, including the correct inference of information.
4.2 Control treatment
As a further robustness check of the model, we also implemented the control treatment
in which the principal is not informed. In this uninformed condition, we still expect
that agents respond positively to rewards in the joint project. However, since rewards
are not informative, we do not expect that e¤ort in the own project varies with the
bonus.
In the joint project, we …nd indeed that e¤ort is higher after receiving a bonus
(see the right two bars in Figure 3). Both after a good and a bad signal, this e¤ect
is signi…cant (signed rank test,  = 31,  = 002). This is also con…rmed in the
regression analysis shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. Turning to the own project,
the e¤ort level of agents does not vary much with respect to the bonus, as expected,
and any di¤erences are not signi…cant using nonparametric tests (see Figure 4). After
receiving a good signal, e¤ort is 5 percentage points lower following a bonus ( = 11
18 = 267). After receiving a bad signal, e¤ort is 1 percentage point lower after a bonus
( = 12,  = 906). The regressions show that e¤ort is not signi…cantly di¤erent after
a bonus when the signal is bad (columns 3 and 4 of Table 4). After a good signal,
the total e¤ect of a bonus is signi…cantly negative, which is somewhat surprising.
However, the coe¢cient is modest in size (around minus 8 percentage points), and
if we estimate the model separately for each signal the coe¢cient of bonus is always
small and not consistent in sign.
4.3 The role of gender and social preferences
We now investigate in some more detail the role of gender and social preferences.
Many studies have shown that people care about the distribution of payo¤s and
the intentions of others. There is little reason to suspect that social preferences are
driving our key result that a bonus is perceived as bad news. In particular, the e¤ort
decision for the own project does not a¤ect payo¤s for the other participant, so there
is no reason to expect that the negative e¤ect of a bonus in the own project is driven
by social preferences rather than re‡ecting informational e¤ects. Furthermore, if
principals are concerned about inequalities in payo¤s resulting from o¤ering a bonus,
they could partially address this by adjusting the …xed wage. Nevertheless, we believe
it is interesting to examine the extent to which the response to a bonus in the joint
project is driven by social preferences.
In the role of principal, we …nd very little evidence that social preferences deter-
mine the level of the bonus in any substantial way. In table 2, we already showed that
the costs are the most important determinant of the bonus. None of the measures of
social preferences has a signi…cant impact. We also did not …nd evidence of any sub-
stantial interaction e¤ects. That is, the estimated coe¢cient of high costs is broadly
similar if model (1) of table 2 is estimated separately for the subsets of participants
who are above and below the median for each of the measures of social preferences.
We also …nd little evidence that social preferences play a role in the e¤ort decision in
the joint project. Most coe¢cients related to social preferences are insigni…cant and
relatively small. “Fair” agents tend to exert somewhat less e¤ort in the joint project
19and “Altruists” a bit more (column 2 of Tables 3). The only signi…cant gender e¤ect
is that e¤ort is higher for women in the own project of the main treatment, but this
disappears in later rounds (column 6 of Table 3).
Arguably the most interesting …nding with respect to social preferences concerns
the response to di¤erent levels of the …xed wage. Figure 6 plots the mean e¤ort in the
joint project for the two conditions, separately for no bonus and bonus (solid lines).
In the main treatment (informed condition, left panel), the e¤ort does not vary much
with the …xed wage. In the control treatment (uninformed condition, right panel),
we …nd a U-shaped pattern: the mean e¤ort is lower after a …xed wage of 5 than
after no wage, but then increases again when the …xed wage is 10. The regressions
also show a negative e¤ect of o¤ering a …xed wage of 5 in the uninformed condition
(Table 4, columns 1 and 2) but not in the informed condition (Table 3, columns 1
and 2).12 Possibly, participants think that a small …xed wage is more of an insult if
the principal is uninformed, because in that case the principal is not o¤ering this as
a compensation for high costs. This, however, is speculation.
This wage e¤ect is reminiscent of “small payment” e¤ect found in other experi-
ments, such as in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b), who also …nd that motivation is
lower for small payments than under no compensation at all, but increases for higher
payments. However, they …nd this using piece rates, while in our case we …nd that
pattern with respect to a …xed wage. We also …nd that the U-shaped pattern is more
pronounced for participants with a level of reciprocity that is above the median (the
dashed lines in Figure 5). It is possible that principals only rarely o¤er a …xed wage
of 5 because they realize that this has an averse e¤ect on e¤ort. In any case, because
of the rare occurrences, these results should be taken with some caution.13
12Estimates from a linear probability model with group …xed e¤ects deviate from those in models
(1) and (2) in Table 4. The negative e¤ect of wage 5 is smaller, and the wage 10 coe¢cient is smaller
and not signi…cant in that case.
13We do not have a reliable number of observations to test signi…cance using the means of groups
as independent observations. If we treat every choice of a subject as an independent observation, the
di¤erence between 0 and 5 is signi…cant after a bonus ( = 000) and at the margin of signi…cance
after no bonus ( = 125). The di¤erence between 5 and 10 is only signi…cant after no bonus
( = 025). The di¤erence between 0 and 10 is signi…cant in both cases ( = 006 after no bonus,
 = 024 after bonus). None of the di¤erences is signi…cant in the informed condition (all 2 tests).
205 Discussion
Our experiment shows that when the principal is better informed about characteristics
of the task than the agent, rewards have hidden costs as predicted by Bénabou and
Tirole (2003). The principal is more likely to o¤er a bonus when she knows the task
to be di¢cult, and this is correctly perceived by the agent.
The experimental design allows us to isolate the informational e¤ects of rewards.
Of course, by no means does this imply that other factors such as social preferences
are not important. As discussed in the introduction, a large experimental literature
shows that rewards may have a strong negative impact on motivation even when
the principal does not have superior information about the task, which is a key
assumption in our set-up. The main channel in that case is the impact of rewards on
fairness, reciprocity and trust related concerns. We view our paper as an important
complement to that literature, showing that the interaction of extrinsic incentives
and intrinsic motivation is a multifaceted phenomenon that cannot be reduced to a
single idea or theory.14 Investigation of the interaction between pure informational
and fairness-related e¤ects seems to be an important topic for future research, both
theoretical and experimental.
A natural extension would be to conduct an experiment with a real e¤ort task, to
test the external validity of our …ndings. The challenge will be to implement the re-
quired two-sided information asymmetry in a controlled manner. Another robustness
check would be to investigate the impact of role switching. On the one hand, we feel
that this element of design helps participants to understand the features of that game
more quickly. In reality, people have more time to learn than we give them in the lab.
On the other hand, many people are always on the same side of the relationship and
may not have an opportunity or incentive to take another perspective. For instance,
some people will never hold a managerial job, and such people may fail to understand
14For instance, the model by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) demonstrates that rewards and punish-
ments can have a negative impact on prosocial behavior because they create doubts about the true
motives of altruistic behavior and thus reduce the importance of concerns for social and self-respect.
In a related model Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) explore how the principal’s choce of incen-
tive scheme, being informative about her character, a¤ects the agent’s desire to seek the principal’s
esteem.
21the exact motives behind the choice of rewards by the employer.
Since in real life the hidden costs we explore may have only a delayed impact, an
important venue for further experimental research is the study of repeated relation-
ships. A model in Suvorov (2003) shows that in this case rewards become “addictive”
if the agent’s opportunities to independently acquire information about the task are
limited. Two new strategic e¤ects arise in the model: the agent tries to appear unmo-
tivated to convince the principal to give a high bonus in the future, and the principal
is concerned about promising a bonus and thus creating “addiction to rewards”.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that the experimental research of the in-
formation transmission via rewards need not be restricted to an investigation of a
negative impact. For instance, a model in Suvorov and van de Ven (2009) shows that
non-contractible ex post rewards can occur even in a …nitely-repeated relationship
if the principal has superior information about the agent’s interim performance. It
shows that rewards may also have informational content in that case, but the in-
formation becomes good rather than bad news. Such discretionary rewards signal
that the principal appreciates previous e¤orts and has high expectations about fu-
ture achievements, thus giving a boost to the agent’s motivation in the remaining
periods.
6 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.
From part (ii) of Proposition 1 it follows that there are …ve possible types of
equilibria: two types of pooling equilibria (the principal always giving no bonus or
always giving bonus ), a separating equilibrium (no bonus when costs are low, 
when costs are high) and two types of hybrid (partially separating) equilibria. In
hybrid equilibria of the …rst type, no bonus is o¤ered when the project is easy, and
the principal randomizes between no bonus and bonus  when it is di¢cult. In the
second type of hybrid equilibria, bonus  is o¤ered when the project is di¢cult, and
the principal randomizes between no bonus and bonus  when it is easy.
Note …rst that the separating equilibrium and the second type of partially sepa-
22rating (hybrid) equilibria cannot occur under our assumptions. In such equilibria the
principal would always prefer to deviate and give no bonus as this induces the agent
to exert high e¤ort.
Moreover, a pooling equilibrium in which the principal o¤ers a strictly positive
bonus is eliminated by D1 (or by NWBR, which is equivalent to D1 in the current
game).15 Suppose, by contradiction that the equilibrium is pooling with bonus 
always being o¤ered. The agent always exerts e¤ort in this case. Let the agent’s
response to the out-of-equilibrium bonus  = 0 be such that he chooses  = 1 with
probabilities  and  when his signal is  and  respectively. Consider the
response by the agent which would make the principal indi¤erent between o¤ering
 =  and deviating to  = 0 when costs are high ( = ). Then the principal
would strictly gain from deviation to  = 0 when costs are low ( = ) whenever
(2¡1)¢(¡)  0 It is straightforward to show that the latter condition holds,
given that the principal’s indi¤erence implies () 6= (11)(00), and given that
it must be the case that    for the agent’s strategy to be a (mixed) best
response for some (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs The NWBR criterion then stipulates
that the agent should assign probability 0 to  =  after observing  = 0, giving
incentives for the principal to deviate, which upsets the equilibrium (see Cho and
Kreps (1987)).
It is straightforward to check that under the chosen values of parameters the
strategies speci…ed in Proposition 2 indeed form a hybrid equilibrium, while the
pooling equilibrium with no bonus does not occur. In the pooling equilibrium with
 = 0 the agent works after signal  but not after signal . Thus, if costs are high,
the principal expects the agent to exert e¤ort with probability 1 ¡  (the likelihood
that the signal is incorrect). The principal would prefer deviating to  (inducing
the agent to exert e¤ort for any signal) if   ¢ which is the case under our
15For a general de…nition of D1 and NWBR re…nements we refer the reader to Cho and Kreps
(1987); Cho and Sobel (1990) prove that they are equivalent in montonic games. In our model
NWBR is de…ned as follows. Consider the agent’s reaction to an out-of-equilibrium o¤er 0 that is
(a) a best response under some beliefs and (b) makes the principal indi¤erent between sticking to an
equilibrium action and deviating to 0 when the cost is  = . For an equilibrium to satisfy NWBR,
out-of equilibrium beliefs must assign probability 0 to the value of cost  if the principal strictly
gains from the deviation to 0 under this agent’s reaction if the cost  =  6= 
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Proof that  = 0 in any PBE satisfying D1 if the agent’s signal is precise enough
(  ¢).
Note …rst that a contract () with   0 cannot be o¤ered with a positive
probability in any PBE: with this bonus the agent always exerts e¤ort for any beliefs
about the costs, so this contract is strictly dominated by the contract (0).
Next, let us show that if contract () is o¤ered with some probability when
 =  and () is o¤ered with some probability when  =  then  · 
Assume by contrast that   , i.e.  = ,  = 0. Hence,  = 0 Let the
agent, when o¤ered (0), choose  = 1 with probabilities  and  if his signal
is  and  respectively. For the agent’s e¤ort choice to be a best response under
some beliefs, it must be that  ·  and  = 1 if   0 By a simple revealed
preference argument, the principal must weakly prefer (0) to (0) when costs
are low, and weakly prefer (0) to (0) when costs are high, so that:
¢ ¡  ¸ ¢( + (1 ¡ )) ¡ 
¢( + (1 ¡ )) ¡  ¸ ¢ ¡ 
Since we must have  ¸  these inequalities imply that  =  If  =  = 0
the principal would prefer to deviate to () = (0) if  = . If, alternatively,
 =  = 1 then (from the same revealed preference argument) it follows that
 =  Then, the principal gets ¢ ¡ in equilibrium. D1 implies (see the argument
in the previous proof) that beliefs after contract  = 0 = 0 should be that  = 
which destroys the equilibrium.
Similar arguments as above imply that () = (00) should be o¤ered on the
equilibrium path with a positive probability in both cases, i.e., if  =  and if  = ,
as is easy to verify.
Assume now that contract (0) with   0 is o¤ered with a positive probability.
If this contract were o¤ered only in case  = , the agent would exert no e¤ort, and
the principal would deviate to (00) Assume now contract (0) is o¤ered in case
 =  only. Then the agent is sure to exert e¤ort if o¤ered this contract. Denote
24again by  and  the probabilities that the agent exerts e¤ort if o¤ered contract
(00) and his signal is  and  respectively. Then, since the principal must be
indi¤erent between (0) and (00) when costs are low and weakly prefer (00) to
(0) when costs are high, we have:
¢ ¡  = ¢( + (1 ¡ ))
¢ ¡  · ¢((1 ¡ ) + )
Since  ·  and  = 1 if   0 this implies  =  = 1 or  =  = 0
We get a contradiction: the …rst option violates   0, the second implies that the
principal would want to deviate to (0) under both cost realizations.
Hence, the principal should o¤er both contracts (00) and (0) with a positive
probability in both cases,  =  and  = . Denote by ^  and ^  the probabilities
that the agent exerts e¤ort if o¤ered contract (0) and his signal is  and 
respectively. For the principal to be indi¤erent between the contracts we must have:
¢( + (1 ¡ )) = ¢(^  + (1 ¡ )^ ) ¡ 
¢( + (1 ¡ )) = ¢(^  + (1 ¡ )^ ) ¡ 
This implies ^  ¡  = ^  ¡   0 This is possible only if  = 0 ^  = 1 and
0  ^  = 1 ¡   1 However, if   ¢ then ¢ ¡ ¹   ¢(1 ¡ ) so
that the principal is strictly better o¤ when she o¤ers contract (0¹ ) if  =  – a
contradiction.
7 Appendix B: Instructions [Not for publication].
The following instructions are translated from Russian. These are the instructions for groups
that were …rst in the main treatment and then in the control treatment. The instructions
for the reverse treatment are essentially the same and available upon request.
Please read these instructions carefully. You will have a chance to earn a
considerable amount of money if you read the instructions carefully. The exact amount
depends on your own choices and the choices of other participants. You can collect your
earnings immediately after the experiment. All your choices will remain con…dential, and
nobody else besides the researchers will know how much you earned. It is prohibited to
communicate with other participants during the experiment! If you violate this
rule we will exclude you from the experiment and you will not receive your earnings. All
25participants in your session receive the same set of instructions. Please raise your hand if
you have any questions and one of us will come to you.
The experiment consists of three parts. You …rst get instructions for the …rst part. The
instructions for the other parts will be handed out later. At the end of the experiment you
will be asked to enter your identi…cation number, located on the sheet that you were given
when you entered the room. This number will be used to calculate your earnings.
Part 1 instructions. This part describes the general setup.
Two persons, whom we call the Principal and the Worker, are working on a joint project.
The Worker may exert a high or a low level of e¤ort by choosing  = 1 or  = 0. If the
Worker chooses the low level of e¤ort ( = 0), he bears no costs ( = 0). If he chooses the
high level of e¤ort ( = 1), he bears cost . The size of  depends on the project di¢culty
and is either a high value of  = 45 points (for a “di¢cult” project) or a low value of
 = 15 points (for an “easy” project). Both values of  are equally likely to occur.
If the Worker chooses the low level of e¤ort, the project fails and yields 0 = 25 points
to the Worker and 0 = 10 points to the Principal. If instead the Worker chooses the high
level of e¤ort, the project succeeds and yields an additional ¢ = 30 to the Worker and
¢ = 30 to the Principal, i.e., in this case they receive 1 = 55 and 1 = 40 respectively.
The Principal is fully informed about the di¢culty of the project (the level of ), while
the Worker does not know the exact value of , but obtains a signal , which can assume
one of two values: \´ or \´. The signal is correct (equal to the true value of ) with
probability 3/4 and incorrect with probability 1/4. Unlike the Worker, the Principal does
not observe signal .
The interaction between the two participants proceeds as follows. The Principal observes
the project di¢culty  and assigns a bonus  she will pay to the agent in case of a successful
project. The bonus can assume either of two values: 0 or 20 points. The Principal also
determines the …xed salary  she will pay regardless of whether the project succeeds or
fails. The …xed salary can be 0, 5 or 10 points. The Worker then observes the values of 
and  chosen by the Principal, as well as signal the . The Worker then chooses the level
of e¤ort , which determines the success of the project.
The Worker is also involved in his individual project which has the same characteristics
as the joint project that is just described. In particular, the cost of e¤ort, still not observable
by the agent, is the same as in the joint project. The worker chooses an e¤ort level for this
individual project ( = 1 or  = 0) in addition to the e¤ort level for the joint project.
The Principal does not derive any payo¤s from the Worker’s individual project
and hence the compensation o¤ered by the Principal to the worker does not
apply to the individual project.
The joint project therefore yields a payo¤ to the Principal that is equal to  = 0 +
(1¡0¡)¡ and a payo¤ to the Worker equal to 
 = 0+(1¡0+¡)+
if the project turns out to be di¢cult or 
 = 0 + (1 ¡ 0 +  ¡ ) +  if the
project turns out to be easy. The individual project yields a payo¤ to the Worker equal
to 
 = 0 + (1 ¡ 0 ¡ ) or 
 = 0 + (1 ¡ 0 ¡ ), depending on the
project di¢culty.
In each round the Worker only earns points for one of the two projects (joint or indi-
vidual), which is determined randomly at the end of the round after both levels of e¤ort 
and  are chosen. The Principal always gets points for the joint project only.
26Experimental procedures
The interaction described in the previous section will be repeated for 20 rounds. At
the beginning of the experiment all participants are split into two groups of equal size –
Principals and Workers. Each participant retains his or her role for 5 rounds, then roles are
switched for the next …ve rounds, etc. If you start as a Principal, then you are a Principal
in rounds 1-5 and 11-15 and a Worker in rounds 6-10 and 16-20. Similarly, if you start as
a Worker, then you are a Worker in rounds 1-5 and 11-15 and a Principal in rounds 6-10
and 16-20.
You will be rematched to another participant in every round. You will not be able
to identify the participant with whom you are matched (and (s)he cannot identify you).
Within every …ve round cycle you will never be matched to the same participant.
If you are a principal, you learn the di¢culty of the project in that round. You then
will be asked to enter a salary  and bonus  that you assign to the Worker. These values
are then translated to the Worker who also observes signal  (which you do not observe
at this point). After the Worker chooses an e¤ort level, you will be informed about the
outcome of the project, as well as about the signal  received by the Worker. Depending on
the success of the project you will be credited with either 0 = 10 or 1 = 40 points. The
salary that you assigned to the Worker will be subtracted from this. In case of success, the
bonus will also be subtracted from your earnings. At the end of the round, you will also
learn which level of e¤ort the Worker chose for his or her individual project.
If you are a worker, you observe signal  about the di¢culty of the project (your
Principal does not observe your signal  at this point), and also the values of the salary 
and bonus  assigned by the Principal. You will then be asked to choose your e¤ort level
in the joint project  and your e¤ort level in your individual project . You will then be
informed about the level of project di¢culty, the outcome of the project, and also for which
of the two projects you earned points in that round.
THROUGHOUT THE FIRST PART OF THE EXPERIMENT THE CONVERSION
RATE IS 1 POINT = 0.3 RUBLES
If you have questions about the …rst part of the experiment, please ask them now.
Part 2 instructions
The second part of the experiment is very similar to the …rst part: it will again have
four cycles, in which your role will alternate between the Principal and the Worker. Now
each cycle will consist of 3 rounds, making a total of 12 rounds. Your payo¤ will be
determined by the same formulas as before. The only di¤erence is that IN THIS PART THE
PRINCIPAL HAS NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF THE PROJECT.
In the beginning of each round the Worker receives signal  about the di¢culty of the
project. The Principal, as before, can o¤er a bonus to the Worker, to be paid in case the
project is successful, as well as a …xed salary. Based on the signal and the salary and bonus
o¤er, the Worker chooses the levels of e¤ort in the joint and the individual projects. At the
end of each round the two participants learn the same information as before.
During each three round cycle you will be matched with di¤erent participants. The …rst
cycle starts with the same roles as in part 1 of the experiment.
THROUGHOUT THE SECOND PART OF THE EXPERIMENT THE EXCHANGE
RATE IS 1 POINT = 0.3 RUBLES
If you have questions about the second part of the experiment, please ask them now.
27Part 3 instructions
The third part of the experiment di¤ers substantially from the …rst two: it will consist
of four di¤erent rounds. What now follows is a description of each round.
THROUGHOUT THE THIRD PART OF THE EXPERIMENT THE EXCHANGE
RATE IS 1 POINT = 1 RUBLE
We …rst describe the setup that is common to all rounds. Two participants are paired,
whom we call the sender and the receiver. The sender gets  = 20 points and can send
 points to the receiver ( can be 0, 5, 10, 15 or 20 points). The amount sent  is then
tripled, so the receiver gets 3. The receiver can then return an amount  back to the
sender, which can be any amount between 0 and 3. The sender then earns the amount
 ¡  + , and the receiver earns 3 ¡ .
In the beginning of the …rst round, you will be matched with two other participants:
in the …rst match you will be in the role of the sender and in the second match you will
play the role of the receiver. The two di¤erent participants will remain your partners for
the …rst two rounds.
In the …rst round you will be playing as a sender. You will be endowed with  = 20
points and you can decide on the amount  that you like to send to your receiver ( can
be 0, 5, 10, 15 or 20 points). This will conclude the …rst round.
In the second round you will be playing as a receiver and will receive the amount 3
from the sender. You will only …nd out at the end of the experiment how much the receiver
has sent to you. You can decide which amount  you would like to return to your sender
for every possible amount (s)he may have sent to you (i.e., 0, 5, 10, 15 or 20 points). You
will therefore have to enter four numbers (since you cannot return anything if you receive
zero points). This will conclude the second round. At the end of the second round you will
have earned 12 =  ¡  + 0 + 30 ¡ , where  is your endowment,  and  are your
choices in the …rst and second round, 0 is the choice of your sender partner in the …rst
round and 0 is the choice of your receiver partner in the second round that corresponds to
your choice of . You will only …nd out at the end of the experiment how much you have
earned in this round.
In the third round you will be playing the role of the sender. In the beginning of
the third round you will be matched to a new receiver (and you yourself will also be the
receiver matched to some sender). This match will hold for the third round only. You will
be endowed with  = 20 points and asked which amount  you like to send to your receiver
( can be 0, 5, 10, 15 or 20 points). The receiver will get 3. You will only …nd out at the
end of the experiment how much you have earned. The only di¤erence with the …rst round
is that the receiver does not have an option to send anything back in this round. You payo¤
for the third round will therefore be equal to 3 =  ¡  + 30, where  is the original
endowment,  is your choice and 0 is the choice of the sender you are matched to. You
will only …nd out at the end of the experiment how much you have earned in this round.
In the fourth round you will be playing as a receiver. You will be endowed with  = 20
points. In the beginning of the round you will be matched to a new sender (and you will also
be a sender for someone). As in the second round, you will earn 3. The only di¤erence
with the second round is that in this round the amount  that is sent to you is randomly
chosen by the computer. It can be 0, 5, 10, 15 or 20 with equal probabilities. The sender
is not making the choice of  in this round, but this amount will be subtracted from his or
her endowment of  = 20 points at the end of the round. You can decide which amount
28 you like to return to your sender for each possible value of  (0, 5, 10, 15 or 20 points).
You will therefore again have to enter four numbers (since you cannot return anything if
you receive zero points). In this round you will earn the amount 4 = ¡+0+30¡,
where  is your endowment,  and 0 are the amounts chosen by the computer on your and
your sender partner’s behalf,  and 0 your choice and the choice of your receiver partner.
At the end of the third part you will …nd out how much you have earned in total for all
rounds in this part 12 + 3 + 4.
If you have questions about the third part of the experiment, please ask them now.
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32Table 1 – Parameter values
Principal value(s)
Value of project if e¤ort  = 0  10
Value of project if e¤ort  = 1 1 40
Bonus  f020g
Fixed wage  f0510g
Agent
Value of project if e¤ort  = 0  25
Value project if e¤ort  = 1 1 55
Likelihood that private signal about costs is correct  0.75
Cost of e¤ort if costs are low  15
Cost of e¤ort if costs are high  45
Table 2: Bonus, Main treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
all rounds all rounds rounds 1-10 rounds 11-20
High costs 0.480*** 0.502*** 0.460*** 0.560***
(0.041) (0.048) (0.041) (0.070)
Female 0.002 -0.043 0.070
(0.077) (0.080) (0.100)
Altruist -0.007 0.007 -0.028
(0.053) (0.060) (0.075)
Trusting -0.017 -0.033 0.011
(0.068) (0.057) (0.084)
Fair 0.025 -0.015 0.085
(0.058) (0.056) (0.077)
Reciprocal 0.043 0.046 0.043
(0.059) (0.054) (0.081)
Number of observations 1,461 1,001 547 454
Number of participants 156 110 110 110
Number of groups 12 8 8 8
Pseudo R-squared 0.181 0.203 0.182 0.242
Probit estimates, reporting marginal e¤ects. Robust s.e. clustered at the
the group level in parentheses. All speci…cations include the treatment order
as a control variable. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
33Table 3: E¤ort in Main Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
joint project own project
all rounds all rounds all rounds all rounds rounds 1-10 rounds 11-20
Bonus 0.636*** 0.655*** -0.230*** -0.195*** -0.062 -0.342***
(0.036) (0.054) (0.059) (0.069) (0.094) (0.073)
Good signal 0.304*** 0.316*** 0.498*** 0.480*** 0.511*** 0.467***
(0.033) (0.056) (0.064) (0.090) (0.102) (0.092)
Bonus X good signal -0.367*** -0.358*** 0.008 -0.062 -0.125 -0.013
(0.045) (0.064) (0.049) (0.064) (0.091) (0.089)
Wage5 0.017 0.047 0.086*** 0.070* 0.057 0.100
(0.044) (0.047) (0.031) (0.038) (0.054) (0.062)
Wage10 0.037 0.093* -0.060 -0.071 -0.020 -0.113
(0.042) (0.050) (0.075) (0.076) (0.102) (0.076)
Female -0.049 0.106*** 0.144*** 0.060
(0.050) (0.032) (0.040) (0.081)
Altruist 0.053** -0.042 -0.104** 0.042
(0.023) (0.036) (0.050) (0.062)
Trusting 0.051 -0.010 -0.062** 0.067
(0.033) (0.028) (0.032) (0.059)
Fair -0.116*** 0.073 0.049 0.122
(0.037) (0.069) (0.073) (0.079)
Reciprocal 0.003 -0.060* -0.039 -0.088**
(0.043) (0.032) (0.048) (0.036)
Number of obs. 1,467 1,007 1,467 1,007 553 454
Number of subjects 156 110 156 110 110 110
Number of groups 12 8 12 8 8 8
Pseudo R-squared 0.267 0.264 0.246 0.220 0.189 0.287
Probit estimates, reporting marginal e¤ects. Robust standard errors clustered at the group level
in parentheses. Coe¢cient and s.e. of interaction term corrected, see f.n. 10. All
speci…cations include the treatment order as a control variable. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1
34Table 4: E¤ort in Control Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
joint project own project
Bonus 0.846*** 0.865*** -0.026 -0.048
(0.029) (0.042) (0.071) (0.090)
Good signal 0.558*** 0.610*** 0.732*** 0.689***
(0.076) (0.108) (0.082) (0.104)
Bonus X good signal -0.361*** -0.389*** -0.053 -0.034
(0.077) (0.106) (0.063) (0.077)
Wage5 -0.213*** -0.257*** 0.062 -0.024
(0.051) (0.054) (0.063) (0.057)
Wage10 0.190*** 0.108*** -0.079** -0.088**











Number of observations 936 660 936 660
Number of participants 156 110 110 110
Number of groups 12 8 12 8
Pseudo R-squared 0.435 0.467 0.376 0.342
Probit estimates, reporting marginal e¤ects. Robust s.e. clustered at the
the group level in parentheses. Coe¢cient and s.e. of interaction term
corrected, see f.n. 10. All speci…cations include the treatment
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Figure 5: Di¤erence in mean e¤ort in the own project between bonus and no bonus





















Figure 6: Mean e¤ort in the joint project by wage level. Left panel: main treatment;
right panel: control treatment. Solid lines is for all participants, dashed lines for
reciprocal participants.
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